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The literature on tax competition generally concludes that international coordi-
nation of capital taxes among symmetric countries increases tax rates. This paper
investigates whether this conclusion also holds in a political economy framework
where taxes are set by elected policy makers. It shows that policy makers are ﬁscally
more liberal than the average citizen if taxes are set non-cooperatively. However,
ﬁscally more conservative policy makers are elected if taxes are set cooperatively.
The introduction of tax coordination cannot remove the incentive to compete for
foreign capital, but simply shifts it to the election stage. The paper proves that
with standard speciﬁcations of the utility functions, coordination leads to lower tax
rates than competition.
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Capital taxation in open economies attracts an enormous attention among economists
and politicians, especially in the European Union. It is a common presumption in this
discussion that tax coordination among independent countries leads to higher tax rates
on mobile capital compared to non-cooperative tax policies. This paper shows that this
presumption is not generally true if the political reactions on diﬀerent tax regimes are
taken into account. Building on a simple symmetric two-country model in which tax
rates are set by elected policy-makers, we show that tax coordination can actually lead
to lower tax rates than tax competition. Therefore, this paper casts doubts on standard
conclusions made in the academic and public discussion on the consequences of worldwide,
or European, capital tax coordination.
In the present model, capital taxes ared e t e r m i n e di nat w os t a g eg a m e .I nt h eﬁrst
stage, national electorates choose one of their members as policy maker. In the second
stage, the elected policy makers set tax rates either competitively or cooperatively. The
tax proceeds are used to ﬁnance national public goods. In this setting, tax coordination
and tax competition aﬀect the voters’ choices at the ﬁrst stage in diﬀerent ways. Start with
considering the case of tax competition. Assume, ﬁrst, that the national median voters
chose the tax rates in the second stage themselves. It is well known that the mobility of the
tax base (foreign capital) creates incentives to lower tax rates. This leads to ineﬃciently
low tax rates from an ex-ante view of the median voters. Anticipating this outcome in
the ﬁrst stage, the median voters have an incentive to elect policy makers who care more
for the public good (i.e., who are ﬁscally more liberal) than themselves, if tax policies
are delegated to elected politicians. Therefore, the tax decreasing eﬀect of competition
is partially oﬀset. Next, consider the case of tax coordination. Under this regime, the
two policy makers choose the two tax rates to maximize their joint utility.1 The incentive
for policy makers to attract more capital by lowering the tax rates is removed. However,
the same incentive now plays a crucial role for voters in the election stage. By choosing
1It should be noted that tax coordination is quite diﬀerent from tax harmonization where policy makers
decide jointly on one tax rate valid in all countries. However, since this paper builds on a symmetric
model, it is not well suited for an analysis of this frequently proposed mechanism. In general, tax
harmonization includes the cost that countries have identical tax rates despite of diﬀerences in ﬁnancial
needs or preferences. Obviously, a symmetric model cannot capture this potential cost.
1delegates with rather low preferences for the public good, the national median voters
try to achieve (relatively) lower tax rates in the second stage and attract more capital.
Therefore, switching from a competitive to a coordinated tax regime replaces one channel
for reducing tax rates by another. Moreover, under tax coordination there is no possibility
to partly oﬀset this incentive through the political process. This paper demonstrates that
with commonly assumed speciﬁcations of utility and production functions, implementing
tax coordination actually decreases capital tax rates. This holds, e.g., if preferences are
log-linear and the production functions are of the Cobb-Douglas type. More general, we
show that this result extends to all utility functions for which the relative risk-aversion
with respect to public good consumption is greater than one.
The issue of delegation in the presence of tax competition for mobile capital has
been investigated before by Persson and Tabellini [10]. They show that elected policy
makers are ﬁscally more liberal than national median voters. This paper can be seen as
an extension of their analysis to the case of delegation in a coordination regime. Our
analysis builds on the symmetric one-period two-country model for international capi-
tal taxation by Wildasin [13]. Capital taxes are used to ﬁnance national public goods
with no cross-border externalities. However, Wildasin and most of the literature on tax
competition assume that taxes are set by benevolent governments.2 They conclude that
tax competition leads to an underprovision of public goods or to ineﬃciently high tax
rates on labor. In a recent paper, Fuest and Huber [6] question the feasibility of tax
coordination. They conclude that cooperative agreements are ineﬀective if they do not
include all tax instruments. A similar result can be found in Cremer and Gahvari [3].
They show that countries might strategically choose to allow for tax evasion in order to
oﬀset tax increasing eﬀects of tax coordination. Our paper demonstrates that even if
tax coordination includes all tax instruments, taxes might nevertheless decrease due to
political reactions. The result of socially wasteful tax competition has been questioned
by many authors working on optimal taxation. These authors point out that in a dy-
namic context, capital taxation faces a time-inconsistency problem (see Kehoe [8]). In
general, it is optimal to tax installed capital at very high rates, but to set tax rates in
the long run equal to zero (see Judd [7] or Chamley [1], for a more general discussion see
Chari and Kehoe [2]). Without commitment, this solution is not attainable. Therefore, it
2For a recent survey of the literature on tax competition, see Wilson [14].
2is often concluded that tax competition is socially preferable to tax coordination since it
partially oﬀsets the time-inconsistency problem. However, as the literature on tax compe-
tition, this view neglects the fact that tax competition and tax coordination might induce
very diﬀerent political reactions. This also holds for the literature that, based on public
choice arguments, replaces the assumption of a benevolent government by a leviathan
assumption.3 Even though this paper deals with the political economy of capital taxation
in a static framework, the result of tax rate decreasing tax coordination should also be of
importance in a dynamic context.4 Our result of decreasing capital taxes as consequence
of introducing tax cooperation indicates that those proposing tax coordination in order to
avoid a race-to-the-bottom might have to reconsider their proposal. However, those who
share the opinion that capital is actually taxed too high (e.g., due to a time-inconsistency
problem) might beneﬁt from tax coordination among short-sighted politicians.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the
model and derives implicit solutions for the equilibrium tax rates in a competitive and in a
cooperative tax regime. These solutions hold for general utility and production functions.
Moreover, it presents suﬃcient conditions for an introduction of tax coordination to induce
decreasing tax rates. Section 3 considers the above mentioned example of log-linear
preferences to further illustrate the tax decreasing eﬀects of international capital tax
coordination. Finally, section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 The Economic Environment
The economy consists of two countries, both inhabited by an inﬁnite number of agents
with unit mass. The agents derive utility from the consumption of a private good c and
a national public good g. The utility functions are separable, strictly concave and satisfy
the Inada-conditions. Each agent inelastically supplies one unit of labor and owns S units
3Recent contributions include Edward and Keen [4], Fuest [5] and Rauscher [12].
4There exist quite a few contributions of political economy aspects of capital taxation in two period
models (see especially Persson and Tabellini [11] and the references therein) and some in dynamic models
(e.g., Krusell et al. [9]), albeit almost exclusively for closed economies.
3of capital, that can be invested at home or abroad. Capital is perfectly mobile across
countries, whereas labor is perfectly immobile. The public goods are ﬁnanced by a per-
unit tax on employed capital Ki, i.e., capital is taxed according to the source principle.
The agents are heterogenous with respect to their valuation of the public good. More
speciﬁcally, the utility function of agent l in country i is given by
Uil = u(cil)+αilv(gi)( 1 )
v
0 (g),u
0 (c) > 0,v
00(g),u
00(c) < 0,αil ∈ <
+
cil = wi + ρS
gi = tiKi
Here, ρ is the net (i.e., after tax) return of capital. Due to inelastic labor supply, the only
(economic) choice of the households is to decide where to invest. Due to perfect capital
mobility, optimal investment behavior of households implies that, in any competitive
equilibrium, the after tax return ρ is equal in the two countries. The parameter (or
types) αil are continuously distributed and have an identical median value, denoted as β.
As described in the introduction, taxes are set by elected policy-makers. Throughout the
paper, we will often call them delegates since they act on behalf of their electorates. We
will characterize the delegates (policy-makers) by the type indicating their valuation of
the public good. For convenience, we denote the type of the delegate in country i as αi.
Firms in both countries are competitive and have access to an identical production





= f (k)=f (K)( 2 )
A politico-economic equilibrium in this economy consists of wages wi, gross interest
rates ri, per capita investments (capital) ki,t a x e sti and delegates αi. When making their
decisions, private agents take the politically determined tax rates in both countries as
given.5 It is straightforward to see that the equilibrium values determined in the private
sector fulﬁll6
wi = f (ki) − kif
0 (ki)( 3 )
5Note that the type of delegates only indirectly aﬀects utility and proﬁt functions.
6As in most of the literature, we do not impose any bound on tax rates. Hence, we implicitly exclude
free disposal of capital. However, the main results of this paper do not depend on this simplifying
assumption.
4ri = f
0 (ki)( 4 )
ki + kj =2 S (5)
ρ = ri − ti = rj − tj (6)
In (6),ρ denotes the after-tax-return of capital, that is equalized among countries due to
free capital mobility. In the next subsection, we turn to the politically determined equi-
librium taxes ti, chosen by the delegates in the second stage of the tax game. Depending
on the regime, taxes are set either non-cooperatively or cooperatively. Subsequently, we
determine the equilibrium types of the delegates αi. The delegates are chosen by majority
voting within each country. However, instead of explicitly modelling the election process,
we will use the fact that the median voter theorem applies in our context.
2.2 Tax Competition and Tax Coordination
We start with the determination of capital taxes in the competitive tax regime. Here,
the policy makers (delegates) simultaneously choose the tax rates on capital. For their
decision, the delegates anticipate the reactions of the private agents on the chosen tax
rates. Therefore, we can insert the equilibrium conditions (3), (4) and (6) into the utility
function of a delegate, i.e.,
Ui = u(f (ki) − kif
0 (ki)+( f
0 (ki) − ti)S)+αiv(tiki)
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Since f00 (S) < 0, (10) implies that the marginal rate of substitution between private
and public good consumption is smaller than one for the policy makers. Therefore, the
Samuelson condition of equal marginal rates does not hold. In order to see that the tax
elasticity aﬀects the equilibrium allocation even though in equilibrium there are no capital








Next, consider the case of tax coordination. Following the literature, tax coordi-
nation means that the delegates choose the two tax rates to maximize the sum of their
utility functions (see,e.g., Persson and Tabellini [11]). Hence, it is implicitly assumed
that the tax setter have access to sidepayments that do neither inﬂuence the utility of










































Hence, in equilibrium both delegates equalize their marginal rates of substitution between
private and public good consumption. In equilibrium, the tax elasticity does not aﬀect
the choices of the delegates. Moreover, any agent would choose higher tax rates in the
coordination regime, as it is shown in the previous literature. However, the incentives to
strategically choose the policy makers drastically diﬀer among the two regimes. Hence, if
one introduces tax coordination, diﬀerent agents are chosen as policy makers. Therefore,
it is a-priori an open question which regime yields higher equilibrium tax rates.
62.3 Delegation and Tax Regimes
Now we turn to the ﬁrst stage, in which the delegates (policy makers) are chosen. Since
preferences are single-peaked, we do not model the political system in great detail. In-
stead, it is assumed that essentially the national median voters decide on the delegates.7
Maximizing the utility function of the median voter (or better, of the politically decisive










































































These equations are valid for both tax regimes. However, the induced reaction functions
∂tj
∂ti diﬀer between the two regimes because both foreign and home tax rates depend dif-
ferently on the elected delegate. Therefore, diﬀerent tax regimes lead to the election of
diﬀerent policy-makers. If we combine (14) with (10), we can see that the policy maker










It should be emphasized that both the elasticity η and the reaction curve
∂tj
∂ti are functions










Condition (16) reveals that the equilibrium allocation crucially depends on the elasticity
η even in the cooperative tax regime, since it aﬀects the selection of delegates by the
political decisive agents.
7However, the central results of this paper do not depend on the validity of the median voter hypothesis.
It is also possible to interpret β, the median of the distribution of types in a country, as type of the
g o v e r n m e n t . I ns u c hac o n t e x t ,β can be the outcome of a political bargaining game among diﬀerent
parties.
7Most economists ﬁnd that taxes are strategic complements, i.e.,
∂tj
∂ti > 0, at least
if the countries are suﬃciently symmetric. Under this condition, (15) shows that in the
competitive regime the policy maker likes the public good more than the median voter, i.e.
αi > β.S i n c e∂t
∂α > 0, delegation has a tax increasing eﬀect. Therefore, we characterize
the policy-maker as ﬁscally liberal. If taxes were strategic substitutes, one can easily see
that the elected policy maker would be ﬁscally more conservative than the median voter.
However, in the coordination regime, one can infer from (16) that the elected policy maker
is always ﬁscally conservative, independent of the sign of
∂tj
∂ti.8 Hence, delegation leads to
decreasing capital taxes. Moreover, a regime switch from tax competition to coordination
always induces the election of more conservative policy-makers. The political reactions to
an introduction of tax coordination, therefore, compensate at least some of the immediate
changes in the tax rates.
One main purpose of this paper is to investigate whether a change from tax compe-
tition to tax coordination leads to an increase or a decrease of tax rates. Essentially, this
depends on the reaction functions
∂tj












=1 ( 1 7 )
It should be noted that by anticipating the behavior of delegates, the national median
voters ultimately determine the tax rates. Suppose the tax regime changes, but the tax
rates remain constant. This view implies that the median voters select delegates that
in equilibrium would choose the same tax rates as the previous delegates chosen under
the competitive regime. Suppose now that the slope of the reaction function increases.
Since marginal utility of public good consumption is decreasing in ti whereas marginal
utility of public good consumption and the tax elasticity of capital are increasing in
ti, tax rates must increase. Conversely, if the slope initially decreases, introducing tax
cooperation lowers tax rates. Therefore, we have to investigate the diﬀerences of the
slopes
∂tj
∂ti between the two regimes. For that, we use the following lemma:
















8Note that the condition
∂tj
∂ti < 1must hold in any equilibrium.
















In (18) and (19),r g and rc denote the relative risk aversion with respect to public















Note that in deriving (18) and (19), we made use of the equilibrium conditions for the
delegates, (10) and (13), in order to eliminate αi. The use of lemma 1 enables us to
determine which tax regime results in lower tax rates.
Proposition 1 A change from the competitive to the cooperative tax regime leads to lower
tax rates if












If (20) does not hold, tax rates increase.
As u ﬃcient condition for a tax decrease induced by introducing tax cooperation is rg ≥ 1.
Proof. The ﬁrst part follows from comparing (18) and (19) and the arguments made
before. For the suﬃcient condition, note that (20) implies








I tc a nt h e ne a s i l yb es h o w nt h a tr ≥ 1f u l ﬁlls this condition for any 0 ≤ η ≤ 1. Finally,
note that rg ≥ 1 implies r ≥ 1.
An increase in risk-aversion with respect to public good consumption ﬂattens the
slope of the reaction function in both regimes because the tax externalities become more
important. However, in case of tax cooperation, the decrease in the slope is relatively
larger, since the reaction functions depend on the utility of both policy-makers. It should
be emphasized that the condition rg ≥ 1 is by far not necessary for decreasing tax rates.
9First, the ratio of public to private good consumption is smaller than one, but usually
signiﬁcantly larger than zero. Moreover, agents are normally assumed to be risk-averse
with respect to private good consumption. Hence, r ≥ 1 might hold even if rg is (slightly)
lower than 1. Second, in the initial equilibrium under tax competition, η will be strictly
smaller than one, as can be seen from (10). Since it can be shown that right hand side of
(21) is increasing in η, (20) might well hold even if r is smaller than one.
In the next section we will use a speciﬁc example to further illustrate the (possible)
tax decreasing eﬀect of introducing tax cooperation.
3E x a m p l e
In this section, it is assumed that preferences are log-linear and that the production func-
tion is Cobb-Douglas. For analytical convenience, the production function is symmetric
with respect to both inputs.
u(c)=l n c (22)











This speciﬁcation implies that rg = 1 so that we know from proposition 1 that tax rates
will be lower under tax cooperation. We normalized the type of the median voters, β,
to one since proposition 1 implies that β does not aﬀect the relative ranking of the tax
regimes.
First, we explicitly consider the equilibrium choices for the delegates. Inserting
(10) and (22) to (25) into (14) and some algebra yields α =1 .3984. However, doing the
same exercise for the cooperative tax regime, results is α =0 .4411.9 Hence, we might
conclude that delegation, measured by the diﬀerence in types between median voters and
delegates, is more pronounced in case of tax coordination. This result is not surprising.
In this regime, the delegates take the externalities of tax rates on each other into account.
9The fact that the types of the delegates are independent of the capital endowments S is due to the
speciﬁcation of the utility functions.
10Thus, compared to tax competition, the median voters must choose delegates with a larger
preference bias (|αi − β|) in order to unilaterally achieve a certain change in tax rates.
Still, lower tax rates with tax coordination might seem to be a paradox. The main reason
for this result is the lack of a competition alleviating mechanism under tax coordination.
To see this point, let, without loss of generality, S =1 . The resulting tax rates are
0.3266 in case of tax competition and 0.3061 in case of tax coordination. Consider also
the hypothetical tax rates that emerged in the absence of strategic delegation. Letting
α = 1 in (10) resulted in competitively set tax rates of 0.2929. On the other hand,
without delegation, tax coordination yielded a tax rate of 0.5, as can be derived from
(13) with α =1 . As discussed in the introduction, competition under tax coordination
works via strategic delegation of policy makers in the ﬁrst stage. Since the equilibrium
tax rate of 0.3061 is higher than the competitive tax rate without delegation of 0.2929, the
tax decreasing competition eﬀect appears to be weaker in the case of tax coordination.
However, under tax competition, strategic delegation can be used to alleviate the tax
decreasing mechanism that works in the second stage. Due to the absence of such a
mechanism, an introduction of tax coordination eventually leads to a tax decrease.
We can further illustrate this example by drawing the reaction function of the policy
makers. With the help of some tedious algebra, we can actually write the equilibrium
conditions of capital market clearing and the non-arbitrage condition as
ki =1− sign(ti − tj)
v u u u u t
µ
8(ti − tj)
4 − 1 − 4(ti − tj)
2 +
r³




Assume we are in the competitive regime and want to investigate the eﬀects of a regime
switch. The initial reaction functions can be obtained by inserting (26) into the FOC’s
of the policy makers (10) and letting α =1 .3984, the equilibrium value derived above.
In ﬁgure 2, these functions are given by the two dotted curves. We see that tax rates are
strategic complements for intermediate and high levels of the other country’s tax rate.
However, for very low levels of the other country’s tax rate, ∂ti
∂tj has a negative slope.
This is because for low levels of tj total factor income in country i is reduced if the other
country’s tax rate increases. The decrease in capital income due to suppressed after-
tax-returns overcompensates the wage increase due to capital inﬂows. By lowering taxes
country i’s policy maker partly oﬀsets this reduction in private consumption.
11Figure 1: Reaction functions






The immediate eﬀect of introducing tax coordination can be inferred from the new
reaction functions that we obtain by inserting (26) into (13) with α =1 .3984.10 They
are drawn as the two outer solid lines in ﬁgure 1. As discussed above, the internalization
of tax externalities quite substantially shifts the reaction function outwards. Moreover,
we see that taxes are now strategic substitutes not only for low (as before) but also for
high values of the other country’s tax rate. In this regime, policy maker i also lowers his
tax rate in order to compensate a negative income eﬀect for policy maker j. Nevertheless,
taxes are still strategic complements for intermediate tax rates. However, the electorates
react on this regime change by choosing ﬁscally more conservative policy makers. This
leads to an inward shift of the reaction functions. Using (26), (13) and choosing the new
equilibrium type of delegates of α =0 .4411 results in the two inner solid lines in ﬁgure 1.
As we derived from proposition 1, this policy eﬀect overcompensates the internalization
eﬀect in our example. Therefore, equilibrium tax rates on capital are reduced.
10Since taxes are now set cooperatively, these are not reaction functions in a strict sense. However, tax
coordination is equivalent to a situation in which each policy-maker sets his tax rate independently, but
the other policy-maker’s utility enters his objective function with equal weight.
124C o n c l u s i o n
This paper investigates the political economy eﬀects of two diﬀerent regimes of interna-
tional capital taxation, tax competition and tax coordination. Contrary to the popular
view, tax coordination can lead to lower tax rates. Once the political reactions are taken
into account, tax coordination fails to eliminate the competition for internationally mobile
capital. Instead, this incentive is moved to the stage in which policy makers are selected.
This analysis leads to important policy implications. We do not expect large drifts in
capital tax rates if tax coordination were introduced. If agents are suﬃciently risk-averse
with respect to public good consumption, e.g., as in the case of a log-linear utility func-
tion, tax rates would even decline further. The current political and economic debate on
capital taxation in Europe focuses on the normative issue whether capital taxes, from a
social point of view, are too low or too high. The positive question, whether tax coordi-
nation increases tax rates, is usually answered aﬃrmative without explicit investigation.
However, this paper shows that this view is questionable.
The model presented is certainly not well suited to give a direct recommendation
on whether tax coordination is advisable from a social point of view, even though it
is based on a standard model in the tax competition literature. For that, the model
had to be simultaneously extended along several lines, which may probably come at the
cost of loosing tractability. The model should be dynamic to make savings endogenous
and the symmetry assumption should be relaxed. It could also be worthwhile to allow
for distorting wage taxes. Moreover, possible systematic diﬀerences between politically
determined and socially optimally preferences for public goods have to be taken into
account. But already in the present form, the paper clearly demonstrated that a decision
on introducing tax coordination, e.g., in the European Union, must carefully take the
induced political reactions into account.
13Appendix
P r o o fo fl e m m a1





















































Replacing αi with the equilibrium condition (10), dividing both numerator and denomi-
nator by u0










































































































































ti (f000 (ki) − f000 (kj))
(f00 (ki)+f00 (kj))
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In a similar fashion, we can derive the reaction functions
∂tj
∂ti in the cooperative regime
by implicitly diﬀerentiating (12) and employing the fact that in equilibrium, marginal
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